We consider a particular instance of a stochastic multi-leader multi-follower equilibrium problem in which players compete in the forward and spot markets in successive periods. Proving the existence of such equilibria has proved difficult as has the construction of globally convergent algorithms for obtaining such points.
Introduction
The first attempts at deregulation in the electricity sector were observed in Chile, England and New Zealand in the early 90s [12, 6] . Similar efforts in the United States followed suit, particularly in states/control areas of California, New England, Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) interchange and New York. One of the difficulties in this process has always been in deciding between a variety of possible market designs, primarily because simulating the impact of such designs is difficult [26, 34] . Arguably, equilibrium models provide a useful means of dealing with the oligopolistic structure prevalent in such markets [14, 5] . In addition, the multiple settlement structure and uncertainty have made these models large and complex [17, 35] . assumptions on the costs and discussed algorithmic schemes. Under a compactness assumption on strategy sets, Hu and Ralph [16] showed the existence of an equilibrium to a multi-leader multi-follower game arising in power markets while DeMiguel and Xu [8] proved existence and uniqueness in a similar regimes under uncertainty. Algorithms for obtaining such problems are notoriously dependent on an initial solution [5, 15, 35] and currently possess no global convergence theory.
Extant theoretical and algorithmic research in the study of EPCCs is characterized by the absence of algorithms that are both globally convergent and scalable with respect to the size of the underlying probability measure. The present work is motivated by both of these challenges. An integral part of this paper's focus lies in addressing uncertainty in the articulation of the spot-market problem. This may arise from randomness in the spot prices or in uncertain availability of the generation units or even from variability in fuel prices. Consequently, the resulting agent problems become stochastic MPCCs. The efficient solution of such problems has gained some attention (see [27] ). Most heuristic approaches for solving deterministic versions of such problems have relied on a Jacobi or a Gauss-Seidel technique. Such approaches require iterating across agent problems till there is negligible change in the equilibrium decision [5, 15] . In contrast, a centralized approach involves determining a feasible solution to the collection of first-order optimality conditions (complementarity problems) of each of the agents [31, 19, 16, 32, 30] . Neither of the aforementioned methods currently possess any global convergence theory. Yao et al. [35] also study an active-set approach for solving equilibrium problems with complementarity constraints and apply it to a multi-settlement model in electricity markets. Our contributions overlap with those of [32] from the standpoint of existence where the author provides a stronger existence result for a class of spot-forward games. Additionally, the work by Su [31, 30] constructs a sequential method for solving this class of problems via the solution of a sequence of complementarity problems.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. First, we consider a constrained form of the original multi-leader multi-follower game in a 2-node setting and relate it to a simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibrium problem, in which the first and second-period decisions are taken simultaneously. An analysis of the mixed-complementarity problem corresponding to the Nash game reveals its solvability. Furthermore, a characterization of the mapping associated with this problem allows one to claim the key result that any equilibrium to the simultaneous Nash game is also an equilibrium to the conjectured variant of the multi-leader multi-follower game. A networked generalization of this setting is examined in the context of a power market where similar characterizations and relationships are observed.
stochastic Nash problems and develop both a characterization for such problems and how the equilibria relate to conjectured Nash-Stackelberg equilibria (NSE). This class of equilibria refer to Nash equilibria between a set of agents, some of whom could be Stackelberg leaders with respect to some set of followers. Section 3 extends the formulation to the electricity market venue where extensions of the aforementioned results are obtained. In section 4, a splitting-based decomposition method is presented for solving such a class of stochastic equilibrium problems along with some computational results. Since the discussion of forward markets has been carried out in the context of electricity markets, some insight is provided from a 6-node electricity market in section 5. We conclude in section 6.
Modeling spot-forward markets
Consider a simple two-node market in which there are n generating firms operating at node 1. It is assumed that each firm sells as much as it generates. Each firm may sell its power at node 2 across a transmission line connecting the two nodes. The price of power at node 2 is given by
where g ω i is the generation level of firm i for a realization ω and a ω is the random intercept of the price function. Specifically, ω lies in the sample-space Ω. The generation cost for firm i is assumed to be linear and is given by c i g ω i . If firm i's forward position is denoted by f i , then its profit π i (given by the sum of the forward-market profit and the expected spot-market profit) is given by
where p f is the price in the forward-market. If we assume perfect foresight in the specification of forward prices, then we have p f = IEp ω and the resulting profit function π i may be written as IE((p ω − c i )g ω i ). This is a commonly employed assumption in such settings (cf. [22, 35, 32] ) and one basis for such an assumption lies in the belief that there are enough risk-neutral arbitrageurs that will trade to remove any possible profit opportunities that exist between the forward and expected spot prices. We recap the variables and parameters of the model in table 1 and note that when addressing the two node problem, the nodal subscript is suppressed when specifying the price function.
The spot-market equilibrium
In the spot-market, under realization ω, agent i maximizes his profit given forward positions f i and the generation decisions of all other agents in scenario ω, often compactly denoted by g −i,ω , as shown by the following parameterized optimization problem AgSpot ω i (g −i,ω ) maximize
We define a scenario-specific spot-market game and its associated equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 (Scenario-specific spot-market game) Given the forward positions of firms 1, . . . , n denoted by (f 1 , . . . , f n ), consider a game G ω Spot in the spot-market associated with scenario ω where the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem (AgSpot ω i (g −i,ω )). Then the associated scenariospecific spot-market equilibrium is given by {g * i } n i=1 , where g * i = (g ω i ) * for all ω ∈ Ω, and (g ω i ) * solves (AgSpot ω i (g * ,ω −i )). Since this is a convex problem in g ω i , the equilibrium point is given by a linear complementarity problem LCP ω 1 , for each ω ∈ Ω:
The existence and uniqueness of this scenario-specific spot-market equilibrium can be supported by the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the scenario-specific spot-market game given by G ω Spot . Then, given a set of forward decisions f , G ω Spot admits a unique equilibrium.
Proof : This follows from observing that the LCP ω 1 may be written as
where M ω = I + ee T , I denotes the identity matrix, e denotes the column of ones,
Since M is a positive definite matrix, it follows from [7, Th. 3.1.6] , that a unique solution to the LCP ω 1 always exists.
Nash-Stackelberg Equilibria (NSE)
A Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium in this setting refers to an equilibrium in forward contracts subject to equilibrium in the spot-market (as specified by LCP ω 1 for all ω ∈ Ω). The ith firm then solves (AgFor i ) in g and f i while taking all the other forward positions f −i as parameters:
The problem (AgFor i ) is a mathematical program with complementarity (or equilibrium) constraints or MPCC (or MPEC) [21] . Apart from the complementarity constraint being nonconvex, it also lacks an interior, implying that the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification [3] does not hold at any feasible point. The resulting Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Forward-market game) Consider a game in the forward market, denoted by G F or , where, given f −i , the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem (AgFor i (f −i )) for all i = 1, . . . , n and suppose its associated equilibrium problem be denoted by (EPCC 1 ). Then the associated Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium of G F or in forward decisions is a tuple {f * i } n i=1 such that for all i = 1, . . . , n, (g, f * i ) is a solution to the ith agent's Stackelberg problem (AgFor i (f −i, * )).
Such a game is a multi-leader multi-follower game and has been recently termed an equilibrium problem with equilibrium (complementarity) constraints or an EPEC (or EPCC). The nonconvexity and ill-posedness of each generator's problem in the previous approach is problematic and implies that existence and uniqueness questions are less easily answered. Furthermore, there are currently no globally convergent algorithms available for obtaining such equilibrium points.
Commonly used approaches include a Gauss-Seidel approach that solves each generator's problem and passes the solution to the next generator with the hope that the iterates converge to an equilibrium point [5, 15, 22] . Scholtes [25] shows that such approaches may result in cycling. Apart from the lack of convergence theory supporting such an approach, the stochasticity in the problems requires the employment of stochastic nonlinear programming methods for solving the agent problems (see [27] for recent work on the solution of stochastic MPCCs). More recently, algorithmic work on such problems has centered on complementarity-based approaches [19, 31, 32, 30, 16] and active-set approaches [35] . In particular, the work by Su [31, 30] employs a novel scheme that solves a sequence of complementarity problems. Each complementarity problem is parameterized by a regularization parameter that corresponds to a relaxation of the complementarity constraints of each agent's problem (an MPCC). By driving this regularization parameter to zero, this algorithm constructs a sequence that is shown to converge to an equilibrium point, under the assumption that the starting point is in a neighborhood of the solution. This is one of the first algorithms that provides local convergence properties. The same algorithm has been shown to be successful in the solution of EPCCs arising from two-period spot-forward markets [32] . The work by Hu and Ralph [16] uses a similar framework in which the complementarity formulation of the EPCC is solved via PATH [9] .
It should be emphasized that apart from the absence of rigorous global convergence theory for obtaining solutions to equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs), the schemes are characterized by an inability to cope with the size of the underlying problems arising from the scenariobased model. Therefore, in considering the development of an appropriate solution methodology, we concentrate on convergent scalable schemes and this represents the focus of section 4.
In general, the model suggested above does not prescribe a functional specification for forward prices. Our intent is to construct a modified Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium problem in which each agent's optimization problem is further constrained by the risk-neutrality constraint in a setting where forward prices are determined by an affine function
and the resulting risk-neutrality constraint is given by
Consequently, in the forward market, the ith agent solves the following modification of Agfor i (f −i ):
The resulting conjectured Nash-Stackelberg game is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Conjectured forward-market game) Consider a game in the forward market, denoted by G con F or , where, given f −i , the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem (AgFor con i (f −i )) for all i = 1, . . . , n and suppose its associated equilibrium problem is denoted by (EPCC 2 ). Then the associated Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium of G con F or in forward decisions is a tuple {f
This modification can be motivated in several ways, two of which we elaborate on: 1. Affine forward price functions: In certain settings, market designers may have more information regarding the nature of forward prices, particularly that these prices are given by an affine relationship with forward positions. Adding the constraint (2) , ensures that such a relationship is respected. In such cases, our constrained model would indeed be appropriate.
Conjectural approximation:
In the absence of such information, making an affine assumption on forward prices allows for providing existence theory and scalable algorithms (as the remainder of the paper shows). The results would then pertain to a constrained or conjectural version of the original Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium problem and represent an approximation. The remainder of this section provides some evidence that the solutions to the Nash-Stackelberg problem and its conjectural variant are very close in some settings. Table 2 represents a comparison of equilibria obtained via the two models for the model described in this section. We assume that a ω is given by N (100, 2) where N (0, 1) is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and variance one. The random cost is given by a random variable of N (10, 5). The intercept of the forward price function is varied to evaluate the impact on the forward positions and the equilibrium profits. Table 2 shows the difference in equilibria for a f = 1, 10 and 20. For each value of a f , the number of scenarios is raised from 1 to 10, to examine the impact of uncertainty. We find that there is no clear trend that relates relative difference to growth in uncertainty. Across the three choices of a f , the relative difference in forward positions does not change significantly. Importantly, the deviation in equilibrium profits (in the ∞−norm) stays reasonably modest reaching a maximum level of 7%. The deviation in forward positions, expectedly, is a little higher but does not exceed 10%. What can also be observed is that while agent-specific profits differ slightly, the changes are often in the same direction. If they are in opposite directions, then the norms of such a change are generally small (as seen with Ω = 2, a f = 1, for instance). It should be emphasized that these insights are pertain to this particular model and more definitive statements can only be made by providing theoretical underpinnings. 
Simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibria (SSNEs)
The previous subsection presented a modified Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium problem, which we will refer to as an NSE. In this section, we construct a stochastic Nash game, in which the first and second-period decisions are taken simultaneously with the intent of relating equilibria arising from this class of games to those arising from the original multi-leader multi-follower game. The resulting equilibrium, referred to as a simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibrium or an SSNE, is defined next.
Definition 5 (Simultaneous Stochastic Nash Equilibrium (SSNE)) Consider the simultaneous stochastic Nash game, denoted by G SSN E , in which the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem AgSSN i (f, g −i )
while forward decisions f are specified as per the risk-neutrality constraint (2) . Then the associated simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibrium (SSNE) is given by a tuple (g
, where firm i solves (AgSSN i (f, g −i )) while the forward decisions are constrained by (2).
The equilibrium conditions corresponding to G SSN E are given by
.
By creating n − 1 identical copies of the risk-neutrality constraints, the resulting equilibrium conditions can be compactly restated as a square mixed linear complementarity problem (SSNE-CP):
where
. . .
The equilibrium conditions of this problem are identical to the joint feasibility set of each agent's problem in the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium problem when constrained by an affine forward price conjecture as the next result specifies.
Lemma 6
Consider a solution (g, f ) to the mixed complementarity problem (SSNE-CP). Then for i = 1, . . . , n, the tuple (g, f i ) is a feasible solution to (AgFor con i (f −i )).
Proof : Follows immediately. Clearly, all NSEs arising from G con F or are SSNEs. Expectedly, the reverse characterization does not always hold. In attempting to prove precisely such a relationship, the question of the existence of an SSNE will be approached by showing that the equilibrium conditions (sufficient) admit a solution. This may be attempted through a null-space approach. This relies on the elimination of (2) which can be compactly written as
Let Y W denote an orthormal basis for the range-space of W T f while Z W denotes an orthonormal basis for the null-space of W T f , respectively. It follows that f can be expressed as
Since W f = e T , Y W is given by
It should be emphasized that the above discussion would have been far simpler if we had used the explicit forms for Y W and Z W . However, our goal was to provide an analysis that could conceivably be extended to accommodate general price conjectures. We may now analyze whether an SSNE can be shown to always exist by analyzing the complementarity problem given by (4).
Proposition 7 (Existence of an SSNE) Consider the simultaneous stochastic Nash game denoted by G SSN E . Then G SSN E always admits an equilibrium.
Proof :
The sufficient equilibrium conditions of G SSN E are given by (SSNE-CP) and it suffices to show that this mixed complementarity problem always admits a solution. But this mixed CP may be reduced to a pure LCP, denoted by (4) and it remains to show that for any f Z , the LCP(
is solvable where M 1 is given by (5) . If e T x i is denoted byx i for all i, then the positive definiteness of M 1 may be expressed as follows.
Further analysis reveals that the expression on the right may be simplified as follows.
Further simplification shows that the right hand side may be expressed as
Therefore, we have that
Since p ω i ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , K, term 1 can be shown to be nonnegative as per
It follows that
implying that M 1 is positive definite and LCP(q 1 (f Z ), M 1 ) is solvable for all f Z by Th. 3.1.6 [7] . It follows that (SSNE-CP) admits a solution and the simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibrium problem is solvable. We conclude this subsection with a characterization of the mapping pertaining to complementarity problem (SSNE-CP). This problem can be viewed as a complementarity problem CP(C, F ) where C, a closed convex cone, and F the associated mapping are defined as
The complementarity problem CP(C, F ) requires an x satisfying
where C * = {u : u T x ≥ 0, x ∈ C}. Note that by showing that characterizing F as a P 0 mapping is of particular relevance in the next section where we attempt to relate SSNEs to NSEs.
Lemma 8 Consider the complementarity problem CP(C, F ), corresponding to (SSNE-CP), where C and F are defined in (6) . Then F is a P 0 mapping over C.
Proof : Recall from Prop. 3.5.9 [10] , that F is a P 0 mapping over a cartesian set C if ∇F (x) is a P 0 matrix for all x ∈ C. Note that the cartesian nature of C follows trivially. Showing that ∇F is a P 0 matrix, requires proving that every principal minor of ∇F has a nonnegative determinant. By the definition of F , the Jacobian ∇F is given by
where M i ∈ R n×n for i = 1, . . . n and W ∈ R n×n . Consider any principal submatrix denoted by
. . , (K + 1)n}, and α i are non-overlapping index sets. We prove the required result by proving the nonnegativity of the determinants corresponding to the following mutually exclusive cases:
1. Suppose α K+1 = ∅ implying that α ⊆ {1, . . . , nK} and G αα is a submatrix of a positive definite matrix. Consequently, G αα is positive definite and det(G αα ) > 0.
Then G αα is a principal submatrix of W , a positive semidefinite matrix, and det(G αα ) ≥ 0.
3. Suppose α is such that G αα contains multiple rows of the system
or |α K+1 | > 1. Then, at least two rows of G αα are identical and det(G αα ) = 0. It remains to show that det(G αα ) ≥ 0 when G αα contains a single row from (8) or |α K+1 | = 1. Suppose M α j α j represents the principal submatrix of M j with index set α j and W α K+1 α j represents the submatrix of W specified by row and column index sets specified by α K+1 and α j . If I α j α K+1 is defined analogously, then the determinant of G αα is specified by
Note that I α j α K+1 is a column of the identity matrix and
where I j and e j denotes the identity matrix and the column of ones in R n j ×n j and R n j , respectively where n j = |α j |. Furthermore, by recalling that W α K+1 α j = e T j and (A) i denotes the ith column of A, then it follows that
SSNEs and NSEs
In the previous subsection, we showed that simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibria exist. Yet, the relationship between SSNEs and NSEs requires a closer examination. In particular, we consider the natural question: When is an SSNE, corresponding to G SSN E , an NSE of G con F or ? Recall that an NSE requires that every agent solves a Stackelberg problem or a mathematical program with complementarity constraints. The remainder of this section focuses on proving when an SSNE is indeed an NSE.
Recall that the SSNE requires the solution of the following mixed-complementarity problem while the NSE is given by an equilibrium problem with complementarity constraints denoted by (EPCC 2 ). In particular, the EPCC of interest represents an equilibrium problem in forward decisions f i in which agent i solves AgFor con i (f −i ). It may be recalled from Lemma 6 that a feasible point to all the agent problems in (AgFor con i (f −i )) is given by a solution to (SSNE-CP). The main result of this section states that any equilibrium of G SSN E is an equilibrium to G Con F or . This requires an intermediate result that relates to the complementarity problem arising in each agent's problem. This agent-specific complementarity problem is denoted by CP(C i , F i ) where
and N i is the ith column on N . We begin by providing a characterization of the agent-specific feasible region arising in AgFor con i (f −i ). Lemma 9 Consider the parameterized agent-specific problem (AgFor con i (f −i )) where the feasible region is given by the complementarity problem CP(C i , F i ), defined in (9) and (7). Then F i is a P−mapping over C i .
Proof :
We employ a proof similar to that provided in Lemma 8. We begin by recalling that every principal submatrix of ∇F i is a principal submatrix of ∇F , defined in the proof of Lemma 8. However, we observe from Lemma 8, that every principal submatrix has nonnegative determinant. It suffices to show that every principal submatrix has strictly positive determinant. since every index set α is given by ∪ K+1 i=1 α i and α K+1 has a cardinality of one. In effect, when considering case (2.) from the proof of Lemma 8, the submatrix is 1 × 1 matrix given by 1 and trivially has a positive determinant. Since all other principal submatrices lead to positive determinants, the required result follows.
Utilizing this result, we now prove that every equilibrium of G ssne is an equilibrium of G con F or . Theorem 10 (Existence of an NSE to
is a local Nash equilibrium of G con F or and a solution of (EPCC 2 ). Furthermore, an equilibrium of G con F or always exists.
Proof : This follows from noting that for i = 1, . . . , n, given f −i , the feasible region of (AgFor i con (f −i )) is a singleton. In particular, if this holds, then (g, f i ) is trivially a local minimizer of (AgFor con i (f −i )). It remains to show that given f −i , the feasible region of each of the agent problems is indeed a singleton. But, given an f −i , the complementarity problem corresponding to each agent has a P−mapping. It follows from [10, Th. 3.5.10] that at most one solution to this problem exists. However, we know that (g, f i ) is a feasible solution to this problem, given f −i since (g, f ) is a solution to (SSNE-CP). It can therefore be concluded that the feasible region of each agent's problem is indeed a singleton. Since (SSNE-CP) is always solvable, the existence of an equilibrium to G con F or is always guaranteed.
3 Networked electricity spot-forward markets Section 2 introduced a 2-node spot-forward market model in a simple setting with n producers and infinite capacities. In this section, we place the problem in the context of electricity markets and consider a two-settlement problem, in which participants trade in the forward and spot markets in subsequent periods. Generally, only physical linkages between nodes or buses are considered and this node-linkage specification is denoted by the node-admittance matrix. The admittance characteristics of the linkages are articulated through the branch-admittance matrix. Our analysis is restricted to high voltage transmission systems, allowing us to assume that the voltage angles are small and the voltage magnitudes are constant. Moreover, the losses are considered to be negligible. The resulting power flow equations are often termed DC load flow equations. Further details may be found in [26] . Throughout our analysis, we use DC load flow analysis to specify flows.
Spot-Market Equilibrium
Consider an n-node network with a firm at each node. We assume that firm i has a generator at node i but may sell to all other nodes in the network (we assume a fully connected grid but this assumption is without loss of generality). The sales by firm i (housed at node i) to node j are denoted by s ij . We collectively denote the sales decisions by firm i by s i,. = (s ω i1 , . . . , s ω in ). In addition, s ω −i refers to the sales decisions of all agents excepting i, namely, (s ω j,. , j = i). Suppose that the nodal demand function at node j under realization ω is given by
Suppose firm i generates g ω i units of power and sells s ω ij units of power to node j under realization ω. We also denote the forward purchases of firm i at node j by f ij . Also the capacity on sales and generation is denoted by C ω ij and G ω i . The capacity and conservation constraints are given by g ω i ≤ G ω i and g ω i = j s ω ij , respectively. We may eliminate the generation variable g ω i by using the conservation constraints to obtain a reduced model:
h(s ω i,. ) subject to
Net revenue from local sales
Net revenue from networked sales with transmission costs
Linear and quadratic costs of generation .
Note that w ω ik is sign-unconstrained and firms may obtain revenue or pay a charge contingent on its sign. The optimality conditions of this problem are given by
for all ω ∈ Ω. The net flow across linkage (ij) during realization ω is given by
A transmission provider is now introduced into the framework. He maximizes transmission revenue subject to meeting transmission constraints as shown in the transmission provider's problem T (s), where s collectively refers to the sales decisions (see below). Note that the firms pay the provider for transmission of electricity; consequently, the transmission provider can be seen as maximizing its transmission revenue. Let the price of transmitting a unit across link (ij) for realization ω be given by w ω ij with the corresponding flow being denoted by y ω ij . The linkage capacity during realization ω is given by C ω ij .
The transmission provider's optimality conditions are given by
for all ω ∈ Ω. We define the scenario specific spot-market Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition 11 (Scenario-specific networked spot-market game) Consider a game G ω nSpot in the spot-market associated with scenario ω and given forward positions f ij , ∀i, j = 1, . . . , n where the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem (nAgSpot ω i (s ω −i,. )) for i = 1, . . . , n and the ISO solves (nISO ω (s ω )). Then the Nash equilibrium in spot-market decisions is given by the tuples {s
and {y * 1,. , . . . , y * n,. } n i=1 , where (s ω i,. ) * and (y ω ) * are solutions of (nAgSpot ω i (s ω, * −i , f )) and (nISO ω (s ω, * )), respectively, for all i = 1, . . . , n and for all ω ∈ Ω.
Specifically, given f ij , ∀i, j, if s ω , ψ ω , α ω , λ ω ,M ω ,Ē andĪ are defined as
and r ω i = (2 + d ω i ) for i = 1, . . . , n, then the equilibrium conditions to scenario-based Nash equilibrium problem are given by the complementarity problem
and the kth row ofF corresponds to link (i, j) andF k,i * n+j = −F k,j * n+i = 1. It should be further remarked that the transmission prices, denoted by w ω ij , cannot be set independently. The equilibrium conditions of the game dictate that these prices are given by the difference between the Lagrange multipliers on the line. Specifically, we have that w ω ij = λ ω ij − λ ω ji for all i, j, i = j. However, we must emphasize that the unboundedness cannot be done away with in general but requires examining if indeed there are equilibria at infinity. In fact, the need to characterize equilibria is founded on precisely such concerns: can there be equilibria with arbitrarily high prices? In fact, while we show that equilibria exist and are given by a solution to a complementarity problem with a P 0 mapping, we observe that the trajectory of equilibria is unbounded (see end of Section 3.3). Note, that a regularized problem introduces well-posedness and leads to unique equilibria.
Proposition 12
Consider the spot-market game denoted by G ω nSpot . Then given a set of forward decisions f , G ω nSpot admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof : The matrix M ω is a positive semidefinite matrix sinceM ω is a symmetric positive definite matrix. Recall that for an LCP(q, M ), if M is positive semidefinite and there exists a z ≥ 0 such that M z +q ≥ 0, then LCP(q, M ) is solvable. In effect, it suffices to show that (13) admits a feasible solution, given an arbitrary set of forward positions denoted by f . Any solution z ω to this problem is given by (s ω , ψ ω , α ω , λ ω ). Suppose s ω , λ ω ≡ 0. It follows from the nonnegativity of q ω ψ , q ω α and q ω λ for all ω ∈ Ω that the following three constraints are feasible:
and it remains to show that
It can be seen that if −f + q ω s is nonnegative then ψ ω , α ω ≡ 0 forms the remainder of the feasible solution. If not, then either ψ ω or α ω can be made sufficiently positive to ensure that
s ≥ 0, whereĒ,Ī have at least one strictly negative entry in every column. This concludes the proof and the scenario-specific spot-market equilibrium problem admits a solution.
Agents compete in the forward market subject to equilibrium in the spot-market. Since, the specification of the spot-market is uncertain, a scenario-based characterization is used. The resulting NashStackelberg game is a networked extension of G F or and is the focus of the next section.
A Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium
The Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium in forward decisions involves a set of agents in which the ith generator maximizes his expected profit from forward and spot positions subject to the complementarity constraint
where N i is an appropriately defined submatrix of N . In an effort to maintain consistent notation, agent i's optimization problem is denoted by (nAgFor i (f −i )):
where the profit function is defined by
The corresponding Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 13 (Networked forward-market game) Consider a game in the forward market, denoted by G nF or , where given f −i , the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem (nAgFor i (f −i )) for i = 1, . . . , n and suppose its associated equilibrium problem is denoted by (EPCC 3 ). Then the associated Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium of G nF or in forward decisions is a tuple {f * i } n i=1 such that for all i = 1, . . . , n, (z, f i ) is a solution to the ith agent's Stackelberg problem (nAgFor i (f −i, * )).
For the reasons described in section 2, the analysis of such equilibrium problems is difficult, particularly from the standpoint of showing the existence of equilibria. In the single node setting, we introduced a conjecture and showed that a related simultaneous stochastic Nash game was indeed an equilibrium to the conjectured variant of the Nash-Stackelberg game. The latter leads to a modified set of agent problems, defined for the ith player as
allowing us to define the conjectured multi-leader multi-follower game.
Definition 14 (Conjectured networked forward-market game) Consider a game in the forward market, denoted by G con nF or , where given f −i , the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem (nAgFor con i (f −i )) for i = 1, . . . , n and suppose its associated equilibrium problem is denoted by (EPCC 4 ). Then the associated Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium of G con nF or in forward decisions is a tuple {f * i } n i=1 such that for all i = 1, . . . , n, (z, f i ) is a solution to the ith agent's Stackelberg problem (nAgFor con i (f −i, * )). Again, this conjecture corresponds with a perturbation of a risk-neutrality constraint relating forward prices at a node with the expected spot prices. Our goal is to examine whether one may provide an existence statement for equilibria pertaining to G con nF or and possibly relate its equilibria to those arising from the networked analogues of SSNEs.
Networked simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibria (SSNE)
As in section 2, we observe that we may construct a stochastic Nash game whose equilibrium conditions are given by the joint set of feasibility conditions of the agent problems. In fact, we showed for the 2-node problem, that an equilibrium of this game is an equilibrium of the conjectured variant of the Nash-Stackelberg game. We pursue a similar question in the networked setting: First, we analyze whether networked SSNE indeed exist and whether they are unique; and we subsequently relate the obtained SSNEs to the Nash-Stackelberg equilibria of interest. We begin by defining the networked simultaneous stochastic Nash game.
Definition 15 (Simultaneous Stochastic Nash Equilibrium (SSNE)) Consider the simultaneous stochastic Nash game, denoted by G nSSN E , in which the ith firm solves the parameterized optimization problem nAgSpot i (f, s ω −i ) for i = 1, . . . , n and the ISO solves (nISO(s ω )) while forward decisions f are specified by the risk-neutrality constraint:
Extending the framework in section 2, the equilibrium conditions of the simultaneous stochastic Nash game are given by the stochastic mixed linear complementarity problem, denoted by (SSNE-CPN).
As discussed in section 2, one avenue for analyzing the existence of a mixed complementarity problem is through the elimination of linear equality constraint [7] , an option that is only available if W f is square and nonsingular. In the current setting, W f is a rectangular full row-rank system and we present a null-space approach for reducing the problem to a pure LCP. This requires an orthonormal basis for the range-space of (W f ) T , as given by the following result. 
allowing us to express (SSNE-CPN) as the following linear complementarity problem:
where f Z is a null-space component of f . Furthermore, W f Y W is given by
Since
It follows that M 2 is given by
If M r can be shown to be positive definite, then M 2 can be claimed to be positive semidefinite.
Lemma 17
Consider the matrices M r and M 2 defined by (18). For n ≥ 2, M r is positive definite and M 2 is positive semidefinite.
Proof : It suffices to show that M r is positive definite. This requires showing that z T M z > 0 for all nonzero z where M r is given by
where r If U T z i is denoted byz i for all i, then the positive definiteness of M r may be expressed as follows.
Finally, the expression on the right-hand side may be further expressed as
implying that M r is positive definite. Finally, for a nonzero vector z = (u, v), the product z T M 2 z can be expressed either as (1) or (2) based on whether u = 0 or u ≡ 0:
leading to the immediate conclusion that M 2 is positive semidefinite. Therefore, for a given f Z , the complementarity problem (SSNE-CPN) is a monotone complementarity problem and its solvability can be concluded through the following proposition.
Proposition 18 (Existence of equilibrium to G nSSN E ) Consider the simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibrium problem denoted by G nSSN E . Then an equilibrium to this problem is given by a triple
and f Z is an arbitrary vector. Furthermore, the LCP(q(f Z ), M 2 ) is a monotone LCP that admits a solution for all f Z .
Proof : From the earlier discussion, we observe that a solution to (SSNE-CPN) is given by (z, f Z , f Y ) where f Z and f Y are the null-space and range-space components of f . Additionally, f Y can be uniquely derived from z by noting that
It remains to show that LCP(M 2 , q 2 (f Z )) is solvable for all f Z . First, we note that by the positive definiteness of M r , the positive semidefiniteness of M 2 follows. From [7, Th. 3.1.2], the feasibility of LCP(q 2 (f Z ), M 2 ) suffices for solvability; in effect, if there exists a z ≥ 0 such that M z + q ≥ 0, LCP(q 2 (f Z ), M 2 ) is solvable. Recall that z = (s, ψ, α, λ) and let s, λ ≡ 0. From the nonnegativity of q ω ψ , q ω α and q ω λ , we have that
Feasibility of z follows by ascertaining if one can determine a nonnegative ψ ω and α ω such that
Clearly, if q ω s ≥ 0, ψ, α ≡ 0 will suffice; if not, by noting thatĒ T andĪ T are matrices with a positive entry on each row, it follows that by either raising ψ or α to a sufficiently large positive level, we obtain feasibility. This concludes the proof.
Motivated by a need to characterize (SSNE-CPN), we observe that this problem is equivalent to the square complementarity system denoted by CP(C, F ) where
where z ∈ R n 2 +m 2 . Furthermore, we show as in section 2, that F is a P 0 mapping over the cone C.
In an effort to simplify the exposition, we consider a setting where transmission constraints are relaxed and only capacity constraints persist. Consequently, the mapping ∇F is given by
where M j is defined in (12) . Note that M j and its inverse are given by
, respectively.
Lemma 19
Consider the complementarity problem CP(C, F ) defined in (20) . Then the mapping F (z, f ) is a P 0 mapping over the cone C.
Proof : We prove that F (z, f ) ∈ P 0 by showing that ∇F (z, f ) is a P 0 matrix for all (z, f ) ∈ C. A matrix M ∈ R n×n belongs to the class of P 0 matrices, if all principal submatrices have nonnegative determinants. This prompts such an evaluation for all submatrices G αα
. . , K(m 2 + n 2 ) + n 2 } and α i ∩ α j = ∅, i = j . We consider the following set of mutually exclusive cases and show in each case that the principal submatrix has a nonnegative determinant.
(i) If α K+1 = ∅, then G αα is any submatrix ofḠ wherē
then det(G αα ) ≥ 0 sinceḠ is a positive semidefinite matrix, implying that it is a P 0 matrix.
(ii) If ∪ K i=1 α i = ∅, then G αα is a principal submatrix of W , a positive semidefinite matrix, implying that det(G αα ) ≥ 0.
(iii) If α is chosen arbitrarily and |α K+1 | > n, then G αα has a zero determinant since at least two of the rows are identical. It remains to show that det(G αα ) ≥ 0 when |α n+1 | ≤ n. Without loss of generality, we assume that |α K+1 | = n, implying that W α K+1 α K+1 is an identity matrix of size n. Then det(G αα ) is given by the following
The remainder of our proof is twofold:
(a) First, we show that det( M i α i α i ) is positive. We begin by noting thatM i α i α i , a principal submatrix of a positive definite matrix, namelyM i , is also positive definite. Consequently, (M i α i α i ) −1 is also positive definite. Finally, the structure of M i allows one to express
where the second term in the product is the Schur complement. The positivity of the determinant follows from the positive definiteness of (M i α i α i ) −1 . (b) Next, we show that the second term in (23) , namely the Schur complement, has a nonnegative determinant. This can be concluded by observing that
Since W α K+1 α K+1 is an identity matrix, it follows that
A characterization of the mapping as a P 0 mapping has immediate relevance from the standpoint that it allows for claiming uniqueness of a perturbed problem. Specifically, the complementarity problem CP(C, F + δI) admits a unique solution where ∇I = I. This has relevance in developing a relationship between NSEs and SSNEs, a question that will be probed in the next subsection.
Proposition 20 Consider the complementarity problem CP(C, F ). Then the perturbed problem CP(C, F + δI) admits a unique solution for all δ > 0.
Proof : This follows immediately from noting that F is a continuous P 0 function over a cone C that can be expressed as a cartesian product. It follows from [10, Th. 3.5.15 ] that the perturbed complementarity problem admits a unique solution.
It would be natural to expect that if (z δ , f δ ) represents the unique solution to CP(C,
where (z, f ) is a solution of CP(C, F ). This technique, termed as a Tikhonov regularization scheme [10] , leads to a unique trajectory that converges to the least-norm solution of CP(C, F ) if F is a monotone map. However, our mapping is weaker in that it belongs to the class P 0 . By leveraging [10, Th. 12.2.8], a sufficiency condition for the Tikhonov trajectory to converge to a solution of the original problem is that the solution set of CP(C, F ) is bounded. Yet, from Prop. 18, we may show that a solution ray may be constructed along which f Z , the null-space component of f , is made arbitrarily large. Consequently, the solution set of CP(C, F ) is not bounded and one may not directly claim that the Tikhonov trajectory converges. Furthermore, it remains unclear if the limit point of this trajectory will indeed be an NSE.
Networked SSNEs and NSEs
Our goal in this section is to derive a relationship between simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibria and Nash-Stackelberg equilibria. The first observation we make is that a perturbed SSNE, given by the solution to CP(C, F + δI), is an equilibrium of a perturbed variant of the conjectured Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium problem. The perturbed game, denoted by G con,δ nF or , is a Nash game in which the ith agent solves (nAgFor
Note the crucial difference between (nAgFor con i (f −i )) and its variant defined above lies in the perturbation of the complementarity problem specifying the feasible region. This regularization is crucial in ensuring that the feasible region of every agent problem, given a collection of competitive forward decisions, is indeed a singleton, as clarified by the next proposition.
is a local NashStackelberg equilibrium of (G δ nF or ). Furthermore, the local Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium always exists.
Proof :
We proceed as in Theorem 10. First, given a solution f −i , the feasible region of (nAgFor con,δ i (f −i )) is given by a complementarity problem CP(C, F δ ) where
But F is a continuous P 0 mapping over C implying that its regularization, namely F + δI, leads to a complementarity problem that has a unique solution (see [10, Th. 3.5.15] ). It follows that the feasible region of the agent problem is a singleton and (z, f i ) is trivially a local minimizer of (nAgFor
is a local Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium of (EPCC δ 4 ). Finally, since the simultaneous stochastic Nash equilibrium, corresponding to (G δ nSSN E ) both exists and is unique, it follows that G δ nF or always admits an equilibrium. It must be remarked that if δ → 0, it remains unclear if we can show that the feasible regions of the agent problems remain singletons, given f −i . Consequently, we employ a fixed positive regularization parameter δ.
In this section, we have shown that a solution to a specific complementarity problem provides at least one solution to the original Nash-Stackelberg game. Additionally, we showed that an approximation of this complementarity problem is always solvable. Next, we provide a quantitative comparison of both the accuracy and computation effort associated with using the conjectured framework and draw a comparison with a more standard EPEC approach. The approaches are employed on a 6-node electricity market model with a varying number of scenarios.
In table 3, we provide a comparison of both the accuracy and effort associated with using the Nash approach versus solving the EPEC, via a Gauss-Seidel scheme [16] . Using the solution to the mixedcomplementarity problem as a basis, we compute the solutions of the conjectured problems and the From an accuracy perspective, the perturbed Nash games provide very accurate solutions even for δ = 1e-4. Importantly, as the size of the problem increases, the accuracy does not degenerate in the perturbed Nash setting.
In terms of effort, the Nash problems are obviously much easier to solve than the EPCCs since they are LCPs. It is observed that the number of minor iterations tends to stay between 20-40 for both values of δ. The EPCC solver cycles through each agent problem, solving 6 MPCCs for each cycle. As a consequence, the total number of minor iterations over all cycles can be quite large. In particular, we see a steep incline in the number of minor iterations as the number of scenarios grows. If one measures CPU time, the growth is even more severe, suggesting that Gauss-Seidel schemes for large-scale problems may be inadvisable.
A decomposition-based splitting algorithm
The earlier two sections, showed that in both a 2-node and a networked setting, the solution to the conjectured variant of the multi-leader multi-follower game is obtainable through the solution of a simultaneous stochastic Nash game. The latter leads to a stochastic complementarity problem and under the assumption of a discrete distribution with an arbitrarily large support, the size of this problem may grow to astronomical levels. As a consequence, direct approaches for the solution of such problems are inadvisable. In fact, we provide some computational evidence to support that the growth in effort is exponential, implying the need for a decomposition method for such a class of problems.
This section is devoted towards developing a scalable approach for solving the obtained class of stochastic mixed-complementarity problems. Methods for the solution of LCPs range from interior-point methods [23, 10, 7] , splitting methods [7] and Newton-based approaches [11, 7] . Extensions to the stochastic case have been dealt with by Lin and Fukushima [20] .
We present a splitting-based decomposition (referred to as the DS method) method based on solving the mixed-LCP through the solution of a sequence of LCPs. Each LCP is stochastic in nature and can be arbitrarily large. In section 4.1, we present the DS method along with convergence theory. The computational burden may be lightened considerably by the use of sampling, and these ideas are discussed in section 4.2. In section 4.3 we provide a description of the performance of the method and compare it with solving the problem directly using KNITRO [4] .
The DS algorithm
We solve the stochastic complementarity problem arising from G nSSN E by a scenario decomposition approach that relies on the ideas of matrix splitting methods (cf. [7] ). This ensures that when the number of scenarios grows, the problem may still be solved efficiently. However, (SSNE-CPN) is not immediately scenario-separable because the equality constraints contain an expectation term and the complementarity constraints contains the first-stage forward decisions f . Our problem of interest is a regularized form of (SSNE-CPN), denoted by (SSNE-CPN δ ), and defined as
Since W f + δI is nonsingular, we may eliminate f , leading to a linear complementarity problem:
If I d , I c and W denote then the M δ can be shown to be positive definite in the next result. This is an important step since the monotonicity of the complementarity problem in the reduced problem provides us with an avenue for developing a decomposition scheme.
Proposition 22 If δ > 0 and W δ f , W and M δ are defined as (17) and (24) then the matrix M δ is positive definite.
Proof : The inverse of W δ f is analytically obtainable by recalling that
After some simplification,
It follows that M δ , after some simplification, is given by
where r
. From Lemma 17 and the positivity of δ, we have for any z = 0,
where H 1 and H 2 are specified in (19) . This transformation has several implications. First, it leads to a monotone linear complementarity problem since M δ is positive definite. However, in eliminating the forward decisions, we witness the loss of diagonal decomposability, often a crucial component for developing scalable schemes. Yet, as the remainder of this subsection shows, we utilize matrix splitting methods to recover decomposability, and therefore scalability.
While the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (SSNE-CPN δ ) follows from Prop. 20 what is not clear is whether a scalable splitting method can be employed for its solution. Specifically, we are interested in solving a sequence of problems denoted by (SSNE-CPN j δ ) to obtain a solution to (SSNE-CPN δ ) where the latter is defined as
and M = B + C. The choice of B is essential in ensuring that (SSNE-CPN j δ ) can be decomposed into a set of scenario-specific LCPs. While this appears challenging given the structure of B, the diagonally decomposable structure of M and the decomposable structure of U allows for precisely such a decomposability. It remains to show that the overall matrix splitting scheme does indeed converge.
Note that the positive definiteness of B ensures the uniqueness of each iterate. Such splitting methods are discussed extensively in [7] in the context of LCPs and are not guaranteed to work in general. In this case, the matrix M is positive definite while B is positive definite (but not necessarily symmetric). Given a positive definite matrix B, we define B such that B T B = . . .
. It follows that D −1 is given by
This allows us to prove the following condition on the spectral radius.
Lemma 23 Given a δ ∈ (0, 1) and let B and C be as defined in (27) and ( . Then the following hold:
(a) If the size of the sample-space K is bounded as
Finally, by recalling that (1 − δ) < 1 ≤ n, we note that A 2 can be bounded as per A 2 ≤ A 1 A ∞ , where the · ∞ and . 1 are given by the maximum absolute row and column sum respectively. The structure of A allows us to obtain explicit bounds for A ∞ , A 1 and A 2 :
Finally, the required spectral condition B −T C B < 1 holds when
If we further assume that p ω j = 1/K for all j = 1, . . . , K, it then follows that A 1 = n and A 2 ≤ n implying that K can be chosen to be arbitrarily large. Note that for arbitrarily probability measures, the result does not require that K be bounded but merely requires that it should not grow significantly faster than n 2 . Moreover, A 1 is large when one scenario has a high likelihood. Expectedly, when n is small, then the resulting systems are well within direct solvers and the real challenges lie for large n and K. Note that the more likely setting is that the probability distribution is uniform (as arising from a sampled problem) and in this setting, the choice of K can be arbitrary. Based on this bound, the convergence of the splitting method can be established, as the next theorem states. Then, for any starting z ≥ 0, the uniquely defined sequence of iterates {z k } converges to a unique solution of (SSNE-CPN δ )).
Algorithm 1 provides an outline of the splitting method. Specifically, the scheme constructs a sequence {z j } that converges to a solution to (SSNE-CPN δ )) where the iterate z j is computed in a scenario-specific fashion, providing (z j ) ω for ω ∈ Ω.
Algorithm 1: Decomposition and Splitting Method
As a final note, we observe that there may be other splitting-based approaches that are less reliant on spectral bounds. Yet these are less susceptible to separability. For instance, given a problem 0 ≤ z ⊥ M z + q ≥ 0, where M is a row-sufficient matrix (that is not necessarily symmetric), then z solves the given LCP if and only if z solves the convex quadratic program
Specifically, M +M T could be split as B +C allowing for decomposing the objective function by scenario (see [7] ). However, the constraints are still not immediately separable by scenario implying that the quadratic program, though convex, is not immediately separable.
Introducing Sampling
In this section, we consider how one may further ease the computational burden by using a sample of the distribution, instead of using the original distribution at each iteration of the matrix splitting method. Consequently, at each iteration of the DS method, we solve
In effect, at the jth iteration, the problem size is proportional to n j = |Ω j |. If the sequence n j increases fast enough to K, such a scheme is seen to converge in practice. An important question is which distribution to use in the construction of the sample. We construct residuals based on r ω j = (z ω j ) T (M ω z ω +q ω j ). The physical interpretation of this residual vector is that scenarios with large residuals are further away from the solution than those scenarios with smaller residuals. This allows for two approaches that are inspired by ideas of inexact-Newton methods. In this class of methods, the Newton direction is computed with increasing exactness as one approaches the solution, the benefit being the savings in computational effort. In a similar fashion, away from the solution, we solve an approximation of the complementarity problem by selecting or sampling a set of scenarios using the set of residuals to guide this choice. Two schemes are suggested. The first merely sorts the residual vector and chooses the largest n j scenarios (from the standpoint of residuals) and is denoted by SORT The second technique biases the true distribution by the normalized residual vector. In effect, this raises the likelihood of choosing a scenario if the residual associated with it is large. We refer to this strategy as MC. Finally, the approach using all the scenarios is denoted by FULL.
Computational Results
The algorithm was implemented on Matlab 7.0 on a Linux platform with 2GB of RAM. The subproblem solver employed was the nonlinear programming solver KNITRO [4] .
Comparison with standard solvers: First we discuss our computational experience with direct methods for solving stochastic complementarity problems and contrast the growth in effort with that seen when using decomposition methods. Table 4 provides a comparison between a direct solution of the problem and a splitting-based approach, on the basis of CPU time. We observe that the growth in CPU time for KNITRO is significantly higher than the parallelized effort associated with the splitting methods. The parallelized time was calculated by assuming that each scenario problem was solved in parallel. It was not obtained through an actual implementation but obtained by as an estimate. Specifically, the estimate used the maximum time taken to solve any of the scenario problems as the time taken for the entire set of scenarios. In fact, for sample sizes as small as 50, the direct approach has already grown in effort by a factor of 100, when compared with a sample size of 10.
Scalability of the method with network size: Table 5 shows how the algorithm scales with the size of the network. While a clear trend is not evident, the number of major and minor iterations does not grow rapidly with the the size of the network. For instance, when the network size is raised from 3 to 18 nodes with 25 scenarios, the number of minor iterations increases from 325 to 925. Each subproblem does take longer to solve since the corresponding complementarity problems have grown. In fact, the key barrier in solving the problem for larger networks lies in the need to construct the matrix of the linear complementarity problem (LCP). Solving the scenario problems can be done effectively for sizes well into the 10s of 1000s of variables. For addressing large-scale networks, we would not construct such a matrix directly but work instead with the scenario blocks. Scalability of method and sampled variants with |Ω|: Table 6 compares the behavior of the DS method. Our basis of comparison is a set of equilibrium problems based on a 3-node network with s scenarios. The resulting deterministic problems are of the order of n 2 s. In fact, even with such small networks, the deterministic complementarity problem is of the order of 20,000 variables. The termination criterion in the DS methods are based on when the complementarity residual, namely
The initial values for the forward and spot-positions are zero. Moreover, the sampling extensions are started at 40% of |Ω| and are incremented by 1.1 at the end of each major iteration. When comparing KNITRO to the iterative methods, we use CPU time as a basis of comparison. Note that the CPU time only accounts for the calls to the solver and not for linear algebra operations. Moreover, all calls to KNITRO are with default options in terms of optimality criteria. However, when comparing the iterative methods, we use the number of major and minor iterations. The minor iterations would essentially correspond to the total number of complementarity problems solved. This is analogous to using the number of function and gradient evaluations for first-derivative optimization methods.
Summary of findings:
The main findings of our computational research were:
• The growth in effort when using splitting-based methods is approximately linear with s while direct approaches result in rapid exponential growth.
• The number of major iterations is approximately constant across different sample sizes and ranges from 8 to 11 when n = 3. For larger networks, the effort does not grow significantly, with the main challenge being the construction of the full complementarity matrix.
• While the sampling/sorting extensions often outperform the full implementation, a conclusive statement requires further research.
Remark on suitability of algorithm: We conclude this section with a short discussion on the suitability of our methodological approach. The problem of interest is a monotone linear complementarity problem and a host of schemes exist for such problems, such as pivoting methods, projection-based methods and matrix splitting schemes (cf. [7] for an overview of the schemes). Our problem, however, is a large-scale monotone LCP with a rather specific structure, arising from the agent-specific two-period stochastic programs. In particular, the size of the problem is directly proportional to the cardinality of Ω, the sample-space. Accordingly, we concentrate on the development of scalable schemes with an important characteristic; the computational effort should grow slowly with |Ω|. Matrix-splitting methods provide one avenue for deriving such scalability since the splitting allows for the solution of |Ω| smaller LCPs at each major iteration. In fact, Table 6 shows that the effort grows linearly with the size of the samplespace. Finally, the construction of such schemes requires providing appropriate spectral properties, as seen in section 4.1.
Note that other convergent decomposition schemes may also be constructed. For instance, an alternate approach could be through the use of interior point methods [10, 23] wherein the Newton direction is computed via a decomposition scheme, an avenue that has been investigated for solving stochastic nonlinear programs [27] . In recent work, Kannan et al. [18] employed a projection-based method for solving a stochastic game-theoretic problem. One of the challenges in such approaches is that the projection step requires the solution of a stochastic quadratic program (when the constraints are polyhedral), a challenge that is overcome through the use of scalable dual decomposition methods [24, 27] .
An Electricity Market Model
In this section, we apply our two-period model to a 6-node power market. We assume that each node houses an independent generator and assume full connectivity between the nodes. Each firm is faced with specifying forward positions in the first period. Subject to these positions and the realization of the uncertainty, the firms then compete in a spot-market. It is assumed that there are s possible realizations that the randomness can assume.
We restrict ourselves to a 6-node model with 20 scenarios in the second period (n = 6, s = 20). Spotmarket prices are specified based on a random demand function p ω i = a ω i − j s ω ji , i = 1, . . . , 6 while forward prices are similarly defined by p Table 7 specifies the parameters associated with the price functions. The base case parameters allow for no uncertainty. Using the base scenario as a reference point, we examine the behavior of the market in a variety of settings. Table 8 provides base case details of each of the six generators. In particular, the first generator has lower capacity of 20 MW with negligible operating costs and can be likened to a wind-based generator. The other five generators have quadratic costs of generation with a capacity levels ranging from 50 to 90 MW. ¤ Base-case ( Figure 1 : Variability of equilibrium profits with costs 3 also generate close to their capacity. Generators 4-6, however, do not use their entire capacity. In fact, as capacity increases, in the face of modest cost increases, firms tend to have higher sales. Yet, as costs increase significantly as seen with generators 4-6, generation levels are depressed. Since the transmission constraints are slack, the nodal prices are identical across the network. ¤ High fuel prices (Table 10) : Next, we consider a setting where agents compete with the possibility of high fuel prices in the future. We assume that generator 6 has the highest proportion of fuel-fired generation while generator 2 has the lowest and further assume that the increase in costs are perfectly correlated for each generator with the actual value of the increase being specified by a multiplier. The reference level of the random linear cost in the spot-market for each of the 20 scenarios is determined by a normally distributed random variable of mean zero and variance one. Using the previously specified multiplier, the corresponding firm-specific generation costs are determined for each scenario. Expectedly, the price of electricity rises as generation is suppressed. Firm 1's profits increase since its costs are unchanged as a wind-generator but reaps the benefits of higher prices. We examine this prospect further by examining the impact of increasing costs on the profits and provide a schematic in figure 1 . Interestingly, as the costs increase even further, low cost generators see a steady ascent in profits at the expense of high cost generators. From figure 1 , it can also be seen that as costs become even larger, the price increases towards the maximum price while the market participation keeps correspondingly reducing. ¤ Higher expected availability (Table 11) : If the capacity is assumed to be random in the spot-market with higher expected availability, the results are found to be interesting in that they do not appear to result in uniformly higher profits. Clearly, increased profits would be expected if capacity constraints are tight as in the case of the wind-generator (generator 1) and is observed here. However, in the case of generator 6, the expected sales increase by nearly 30 units from the base case with a steep decline in profits. In effect, incremental generation from the base case comes at a significant loss. A possible answer lies in the quadratic costs of generation. Incremental generation, despite its availability, comes at a significant loss. To ascertain if quadratic costs do contribute, we recomputed the equilibria under the assumption of zero quadratic costs, we find that the generation levels are at capacity -essentially the quadratic costs were keeping generation suppressed (see table 12 ). Another possible explanation may be found in noting that increasing the availability leads to more intense competition. This manifests in higher generation and correspondingly lower prices and profits. ¤ Highly constrained transmission lines (Table 13) : Constrained transmission lines are often pointed as being responsible for high nodal prices. In fact, if transmission capacities of lines leading to node 1 are assumed to reduce from 4 units to 0.5 units, then (see figure 2 ) it can be seen that while nodal prices are very similar for higher levels of transmission levels, at lower levels of transmission the nodal price at node 1 jumps by more than 20 units as this node is effectively isolated. In fact, the price at that node is a directly related to available generation capacity at that node. Table 13 provides a summary of expected profits under the setting that capacity levels are 0.5. Interestingly, the isolated generator garners nearly 30% higher profits than the base case in a constrained transmission setting. Insights from the model: Finally, some insights are provided from a 6-node electricity market model with uncertain spot-prices, costs and capacities:
• In a regime of high fuel prices, firms with low cost generation garner profits at the expense of firms with higher costs. As costs keep increasing, prices increase and participation falls.
• Higher expected availability does not manifest itself in increased profits, partially because increased generation is less profitable owing to quadratic costs and possibly from more intense competition. If the quadratic cost of generation is reduced to zero, we do observe that not only do firms make more profits, they generate at full capacity.
• Constrained transmission lines lead to price differences across the network. Particularly interesting is the increase in profits arising from high prices seen in nodes that have reduced access to the rest of the network.
Contributions and Future Research
This paper is motivated by the challenges in both proving the existence of a Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium in an uncertain multiperiod setting as well as by question of developing scalable convergent algorithms for obtaining such points. In this section, we summarize some of the main thrusts of our work.
belief of how forward prices are set. Alternately, one could also view such a constraint as being a conjecture on forward price functions. In the current context, preliminary numerical tests show that equilibrium profits vary slightly between the conjectured and original models and suggest that these differences are relatively invariant to price function intercepts and uncertainty.
2. We construct a simultaneous stochastic Nash-equilibrium (SSNE) problem whose solution is shown to be a local Nash equilibrium of the conjectured version of the original multi-leader multi-follower game. Furthermore, we show that the SSNE always exists and is characterized by a complementarity problem with a P 0 mapping in both 2-node and more general networked settings.
3. The SSNE may be obtained as a solution to a stochastic mixed-complementarity problem. A scalable matrix splitting algorithm for solving large-scale stochastic problems is presented along with global convergence theory. Preliminary computational tests show that computational effort grows linearly with the size of the underlying distribution. Also, sampled variants of the algorithms are often seen to perform better. Further tests show that the number of major and minor iterations do not grow significantly with the size of the network.
4. We use our model to derive insights from a 6-node spot-forward electricity market in which costs, prices and capacities are uncertain in the second-period. We observe that higher expected availability appears to result in higher profits in settings where the quadratic costs are modest. Furthermore, when transmission lines to a particular node or zone are constrained, it is seen that both prices and profits rise steeply in that region.
